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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920803-CA 
v. : 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Jason Thomas Genovesi appeals his conviction 
for manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), entered, upon a jury verdict, by the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, 
the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1993) (non-capital, non-first degree felony conviction). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In response to the issues framed by Genovesi, the State 
first raises some threshold issues that may be dispositive of 
part of his appeal. The issues addressed in this brief are: 
I. Was there Reversible Error in the Trial Court's 
Denial of Genovesi's Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Obtained in Two Searches of His Home? The State divides this 
issue into four subissues and alternative issues, as follows: 
A. Has Genovesi Waived His Search and Seizure 
Argument, at Least in Part, by Failing to Properly Specify 
the Evidence Obtained During the Two Searches? This issue, 
not ruled upon in the trial court, is a question reviewed de 
novo by this Court, thus effectively as a matter of law. 
B. Even Assuming that Both Home Searches Were 
Improper, Was the Trial Court's Refusal to Suppress the 
Evidence Obtained During the Searches Harmless Error? 
Again, this is a de novo question, by nature addressed for 
the first time on appeal. For this appeal, the State 
accepts the burden of proving harmlessness. Cf. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). 
C. Can this Court Adequately Review the Trial 
Court's Denial of Genovesi's Motion to Suppress Evidence, 
Even Though the Trial Court Did Not Enter Fully Detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? The adequacy of 
trial court findings, and the consequence of inadequate 
findings, is again a question that is determined de novo by 
the reviewing appellate court. See State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 786-89 (Utah 1991). 
D. If the Trial Court's Ruling Can be Reviewed on 
the Present Record, Did the Trial Court Correctly: 
1. Determine that the First Home Search, 
Performed Incident to a Medical Emergency Call to 
Genovesi's Home, Was Proper? Because the trial court 
did not formally resolve this question, this Court may 
effectively analyze it de novo: the underlying 
"predicate facts" are deferentially reviewed, for 
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"clear error." State v. Vigil. 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 
(Utah App. 1991). 
2. Determine that the Second Home Search Was 
Proper, Because Supported by the Voluntary Consent of 
Genovesifs Wife? Where consent is not preceded by 
illegal police conduct, the determination of 
voluntariness is a fact question, reviewed for "clear 
error." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227, 
93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
But see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262, 1268-71 
(Utah 1993) (apparently broadly holding that question 
of voluntary consent, while "primarily a factual 
question," is always reviewed on appeal as a matter of 
law, without deference to trial court). 
II. Was Defendant's Constitutional Right to an 
Impartial Jury Satisfied, Given that His Jury Was Selected from a 
Panel Composed Largely of Persons Whose Last Names Begin with the 
Letters "S" and »T"? This appears to be a question of law, 
reviewed without deference to the trial court, asking whether 
persons with last names beginning with particular letters are 
"cognizable groups" for the purpose of "fair cross-section" 
analysis, under constitutional guarantees that criminal 
defendants shall be tried to impartial juries. See State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575-76 (Utah 1987) (declining to hold that 
Hispanics are a cognizable group, for sixth amendment purposes, 
in Utah); Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1990) (per 
3 
curiam) (persons whose surnames begin with particular letters do 
not constitute cognizable groups). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are 
practically identical in their language. The former provision 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
The text of other constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions 
pertinent to this appeal will be set forth as needed in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Genovesi's Statement of the Case (Br. of 
Appellant at 6-7) accurately reports that he was tried for murder 
(formerly second degree murder), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
4 
1992), a first degree felony, in connection with the death of his 
stepson. The trial jury convicted Genovesi of the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990), a second degree felony (R. 220). He was sentenced to a 
prison term of one to fifteen years, and fined (R. 224). 
Genovesi now appeals, alleging reversible error stemming from two 
searches of his home, and in the process by which a panel of 
prospective jurors was summoned to serve for his trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Investigation of Death 
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, medical personnel 
responded to an emergency "911" call from a home shared by 
Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two children from a previous 
marriage (R. 423-24, 496) . Genovesi, who made the call, had been 
at home, in charge of the children, while Mrs. Genovesi was at 
work (R. 424-25). The medical workers found Genovesi kneeling 
over his two-year-old stepson, Gavin Adams. Gavin appeared to be 
dead, his neck broken (R. 424, 497-99, 550-54). Nevertheless, 
resuscitation efforts were begun. 
Police also responded to the Genovesi emergency, the 
first officers arriving while the medical personnel were working 
on Gavin (R. 516-18, 561-63). Officer Kenneth Patrick, who 
arrived shortly after Gavin was removed by ambulance, performed a 
cursory search of the Genovesi home. He seized a wash cloth that 
had been used by Genovesi and the medical personnel, and took 
some photographs of the home's interior (R. 242, 245, 249). Upon 
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interviewing Genovesi, Officer Patrick arrested him for child 
abuse (R. 10, 249). 
The resuscitation efforts failed, and Gavin Adams was 
pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at a nearby hospital 
(R. 586). The next day, March 21, investigating Gavin's death as 
a possible homicide, Officer Patrick telephoned Lisa Genovesi.1 
Mrs. Genovesi agreed to allow Patrick into the Genovesi home, to 
take measurements and to search for evidence. Officer Patrick 
verified Mrs. Genovesi's permission, restating his intentions at 
least once, if not twice (R. 242-44). 
Mrs. Genovesi, who was staying elsewhere in the 
aftermath of Gavin's death, arranged for a friend to meet Officer 
Patrick at her home with the house key, to permit his entry (R. 
244-45) . Inside the home, Officer Patrick, assisted by another 
officer, took measurements and more photographs--particularly of 
a bunk bed from which, according to Genovesi, Gavin had fallen, 
causing his fatal injuries. 
In the children's bedroom that contained the bunk bed, 
the officers observed a dented section of plasterboard wall, with 
a piece of hair stuck to it; they seized and preserved the hair 
(R. 685-86). They also cut away and seized, as evidence, the 
dented wall section and a section of carpet, also from the 
bedroom (R. 245-46, 684-88). 
*When this case went to trial, Lisa Genovesi had resumed her 
previous last name, Adams (R. 423). She is referred to as "Mrs. 
Genovesi" in this brief solely for purposes of clarity. 
6 
Meanwhile, the autopsy of Gavin Adams confirmed that 
his death had been caused by severe head and neck injuries. 
Accordingly, the charge against Genovesi was upgraded from child 
abuse to murder (R. 6-8). 
Pretrial Motions 
Before trial, Genovesi moved to suppress all evidence 
seized from his home (R. 30, 41-50). Following an evidentiary 
hearing (R. 238-62), the trial court found that "Lisa Genovesi, 
the wife of the defendant, did tell Kenneth Patrick, in a 21 
March 1992 telephone conversation, that he could go to 
defendant's and her residence to search for and collect evidence 
pertinent to the death of Gavin Adams." The motion to suppress 
was therefore denied (R. 112-13). 
On the date set for trial, the trial court discovered 
that of the forty-eight prospective jurors summoned for the case, 
all but five had last names beginning with the letters "S" or "T" 
(R. 315-17). The district court's "jury clerk" explained that 
this odd pattern resulted from a computer program that randomly 
culled "blocks" from the nearly three thousand-member pool of 
citizens available for jury service. The computer had evidently 
defined many of its prospective juror "blocks" alphabetically (R. 
295-310, T. 3-18 (copied in Addendum IV to Br, of Appellant)). 
Defendant objected to the summoned panel. The trial court, 
finding that no constitutionally "recognizable group" had been 
eliminated from the panel by the computer's method of summoning 
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jurors, overruled the objection (R. 309-10, T. 17-18 (Addendum IV 
to Br. of Appellant)). 
Trial 
Once the final eight-member jury was seated, trial 
spanned three days (R. 404-915). In exhaustive detail, the 
medical examiner who had autopsied Gavin Adams described her 
findings (R. 572-680). Based upon Gavin's serious injuries, and 
upon reference to published medical studies, she opined that 
Gavin had not died as the result of a fall, as suggested by the 
defense. Rather, the examiner testified, Gavin had died as the 
result of homicide (R. 587-88, 624-35).2 The prosecutor 
stressed this medical evidence in closing argument (R. 861-63, 
871, 900). 
The medical examiner also placed the time that Gavin 
was injured at five to six hours before death--that is, several 
hours before Genovesi placed his "911" call (R. 623). This was 
consistent with the observations, by the emergency medical 
workers, that Gavin appeared to be beyond resuscitative efforts 
when they arrived at the Genovesi home, just minutes after the 
"911" call (R. 547, 552). It was inconsistent with Genovesi's 
story, told to his wife the next day, that he had "heard a 
thump," found Gavin fallen by the bunk bed, and "immediately" 
made the "911" call (R. 440). 
2The examiner concluded that Gavin's fatal head and neck 
injuries had been caused by "the head being swung or moved forcibly 
against a relatively fixed object . . . " (R. 619-20). 
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The "911" call, recorded on tape, was replayed at 
trial: during that call, Genovesi reported that Gavin had fallen 
from the bunk bed while playing with his older brother (R. 530, 
855, 892).3 To the responding medical personnel and police, 
however, Genovesi gave inconsistent accounts: To some, he 
reported that Gavin had fallen from "a crib," not a bunk bed (R. 
497, 511-12, 520, 537, 565). The crib, however, was in a 
different room, on a different level of the split-level home, 
than the bunk bed (R. 565-67). 
Genovesi also told the emergency responders that the 
older brother had been with him, rather than with Gavin, when 
Gavin allegedly fell (R. 520, 716-17). Genovesi's inconsistent 
accounts of what had happened to Gavin were, along with the 
medical evidence, also highlighted in the prosecutor's closing 
argument (R. 855-56, 860, 867) . 
A State's expert witness testified that the hair, found 
in the dented section of the home's bedroom wall during the 
second search, "could have come" from Gavin's scalp (R. 703-04). 
However, during closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged 
uncertainties on this question, and on the question of whether 
the wall dent had been made by Gavin's head (R. 904-06).4 
3The "911" tape has not been transmitted to the State with the 
record on appeal; the recited portion of Genovesi's statement on 
the tape is taken from the prosecutor's closing argument. 
4Because the hair found in the wall had been broken off, 
rather than pulled out, it contained no hair root tissue for DNA 
comparison, which might have allowed a more certain conclusion that 
it had come from Gavin's scalp (R. 708). 
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The wash cloth, taken from the Genovesi home on March 
20, the day of the emergency call, was not offered into evidence. 
Numerous photographs of the home's interior were admitted, but 
without differentiation between those taken on March 20, and 
those taken March 21, during the search permitted by Mrs. 
Genovesi (State's exhibits 5-29, R. 294). 
The dented plasterboard wall section and piece of 
carpet, seized during the March 21 search, were admitted into 
evidence (R. 690-93). Neither item, as it turned out, was 
claimed by the State to be especially probative of its homicide 
theory. Instead, the defense used them heavily, calling expert 
witnesses--two engineers, not medical experts--to testify about 
elaborate tests they had performed by dropping a bowling ball on 
to the piece of carpet, and by swinging a bowling ball and a 
dumbbell against a piece of plasterboard similar to that taken 
from the Genovesi home (R. 391-96, 780-803, 815-28). Perhaps 
using measurements taken by Officer Patrick (this is not clear), 
the engineers used fifty-three inches as the height of the bunk 
bed in the Genovesi home (R. 735, 741, 796). The defense thus 
attempted to show that Gavin Adams's death could hcive been caused 
by a fall from the bunk bed on to the carpeted floor below.5 
5The defense was a bit more detailed than described in the 
main text: Genovesi actually attempted to show that Gavin could 
have died from a combination of a bathtub fall several days 
earlier, which was then compounded by the purported bunk bed fall 
(R. 416, 469-71, 890). Main text references to "a fall," as the 
defense theory of the cause of Gavin's death, are intended to 
encompass both claimed mishaps. 
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Evidently not satisfied that the elements of murder had 
been proven, the jury found Genovesi guilty of manslaughter. He 
now appeals, alleging reversible error in the denial of his 
pretrial motions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Genovesi failed to fully specify which evidence 
was obtained in each of the two separate home searches, he has 
effectively waived the opportunity to achieve suppression of some 
evidence, on appeal, unless this Court invalidates both searches. 
One seized item complained of by Genovesi was not even offered 
into evidence, and the propriety of its seizure is therefore a 
moot question on appeal. 
Even assuming that the trial court should have 
suppressed all of the seized evidence from use at trial, the 
error in failing to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence seized from the Genovesi home was unnecessary to 
prove the State's case. Genovesi was convicted on the strength 
of overwhelming evidence, unrelated to any possible impropriety 
in the two home searches, that Gavin Adams did not die in an 
accident, but because of an assault by Genovesi. 
The testimony supporting the denial of Genovesi#s 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence was uncontradicted and 
internally consistent. The only pertinent, unaddressed factual 
issue, involving the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's consent to the 
second home search, can be conceded by the State for this appeal. 
Therefore, this Court can review the denial of Genovesi's 
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suppression motion on the present record, and need not remand the 
issue for a more detailed trial court ruling. 
Genovesi's motion to suppress was properly denied. The 
first search was conducted incident to Genovesi's emergency call, 
and incident to his arrest, also made at that time. The search 
was cursory in nature, and properly limited in scope to the 
exigency that prompted it. The trial court's ruling that the 
second search was authorized by voluntary consent was correct, 
for there is no inkling that Mrs. Genovesi's consent was obtained 
by coercion. The consent probably did not contemplate the 
physical cutting away of parts of the home. However, the trial 
court's refusal to suppress the pieces of wall and carpet seized 
in this manner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: those 
items were wholly insignificant as State's evidence. 
Genovesi's motion to strike the summoned jury panel was 
also properly denied. Genovesi fails to show systematic 
exclusion of any properly "cognizable" or "distinctive" groups 
from the jury panel. His argument that such groups can be 
defined solely from the first letters of their surnames has been 
squarely rejected by the other courts that have considered it. 
The panel reflected the broad range of relevant citizen 
backgrounds, and was therefore a proper, "fair cross-section" 




THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF GENOVESI'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
Introduction 
Genovesi requests reversal of the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence, which was founded upon his 
allegation that both the March 20 and 21 home searches violated 
constitutional search and seizure principles. The March 20 
search, he argues, went beyond the scope of what was permissible 
incident to his "911" call. He then argues that the March 21 
search was not supported by legally adequate, voluntary consent, 
and that it also exceeded the proper scope contemplated by Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent. 
Before proceeding to the issues framed by Genovesi, the 
State raises two threshold issues. Considered in tandem, these 
two issues permit rejection of Genovesi's search and seizure 
argument altogether. 
A. Genovesi's Nonspecific Motion to Suppress Impedes 
his Claim to Appellate Relief. 
The State's first threshold issue involves Genovesi's 
inadequate specification of the precise relief sought. Genovesi 
has not, either in the trial court or on appeal, ever fully 
specified which items of evidence were seized during the March 20 
search, as opposed to the March 21 search. In fact, his written 
motion to suppress, challenging "the warrantless search," only 
addressed the latter search (R. 30, 41-49, copied in Appendix I 
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of this brief). Genovesi did not challenge the March 20 search 
until the hearing on his motion to suppress (R. 253). 
As follows, such lack of specificity causes problems 
for Genovesi. If he proves that only one of the two searches was 
improper, only some uncertain portion of all the seized evidence 
will be subject to the exclusionary rule. There is also one 
item, apparently assailed by Genovesi as wrongfully seized, that 
was never offered into evidence, and therefore is not a proper 
subject for this appeal. 
1. Photographs: When Taken? 
Twenty-five interior photographs of the Genovesi home 
were admitted at Genovesi's trial (State's exhibits 5-29, R. 
294). Photos were taken during both the March 20 and 21 
searches, but nothing in the record ties any of the photos 
admitted at trial to a specific search date. It seems likely 
that some of the photos were taken during each of the two 
searches. 
Therefore, if only one of the two searchers is ruled 
improper on appeal, only the photos taken during that search are 
subject to suppression, while photos taken during the other, 
proper search remain admissible. This leaves a problem: which 
of the photos are to be suppressed? In short, Genovesi has not 
specified the precise relief due to him if only one search was 
improper. But as the movant for suppression of evidence, such 
specification has always been his duty. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(a) (a pretrial motion "shall state with particularity the 
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grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief 
sought"). 
Accordingly, if this Court holds that only one of the 
searches was improper, it should deem the prospect of suppressing 
photographs taken during such search to be waived. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12(d) (failure to make timely request constitutes waiver 
thereof). Put another way, unless Genovesi convinces this Court 
that both searches were improper, he cannot achieve suppression 
of any of the photographs that were admitted at his trial. 
2. Wash Cloth: Mootness 
While complaining about the seizure of a wash cloth 
during the March 20 search (Br. of Appellant at 10), Genovesi 
neglects to mention that this item was neither offered nor 
admitted into evidence at trial. Therefore, the question of 
whether the wash cloth should have been suppressed has no bearing 
on his criminal prosecution.6 As such, that question is moot, 
and under Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it 
should not be addressed. Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 
(Utah 1989) (question is moot where its resolution cannot affect 
the litigants' rights). 
3. Hair, Piece of Wall, Piece of Carpet. 
The record does show that the hair that "could have 
come" from Gavin Adams's head, the dented section of wall in 
which the hair was found, and the section of carpet were all 
6If the wash cloth was unreasonably seized, Genovesi's remedy 
would simply be that it be returned, or if not returned, that he be 
compensated for its loss. 
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seized during the March 21 search. These items will be addressed 
at the appropriate points in this brief, 
B. Even if Genovesi's Motion to Suppress Was 
Erroneously Denied in All Aspects, Such Error Was 
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
This Court does not need to sort out Genovesi's vague, 
nonspecific motion to suppress. Instead, it can decline to 
address the propriety of either of the two challenged searches. 
As its second threshold issue, dispositive of Genovesi's search 
and seizure arguments, the State submits that any error in the 
admission of the seized evidence, against Genovesi's pretrial 
motion to suppress, was harmless. 
For purposes of this analysis, this Court may assume, 
without deciding, that both searches of Genovesi's home were 
improper, and that all evidence obtained during those searches 
should have been suppressed. Even so assuming, Genovesi's 
conviction need not be reversed for the failure to suppress that 
evidence at his trial. 
1. Reasons for Harmless Error Analysis. 
Harmless error analysis is, of course, a legitimate and 
venerable approach to trial errors involving procedural and 
evidentiary rules. E.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 
103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error rules mandating that 
trial errors that do not affect "substantial rights" shall be 
disregarded). See generally State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 
(Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987) 
(discussing harmless error). Such analysis serves the beneficial 
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purpose of avoiding needlessly duplicative new trials, thereby 
conserving trial court resources: 
[I]f the fabled "day in court" is permitted 
casually to multiply into twenty days in court, 
the inevitable consequence is that, by the 
inexorable law of mathematics, nineteen other 
litigants are denied any court time at all, save 
only the few moments required for the tendering of 
their negotiated pleas. 
Davis v. State, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Md. App.), cert, granted, 
616 A.2d 1286 (Md. 1992). New trials, for errors that had no 
discernible impact upon the original trial, also subject 
litigants and witnesses to needless inconvenience, expense, and, 
in cases like this one, repetition of trauma and heartache. 
Consistent with such concerns, the federal Supreme 
Court has squarely endorsed harmless error analysis even for 
errors that are constitutional in dimension. See Chambers v. 
Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1982 (1970) 
(upholding conviction where possibly erroneous admission of 
evidence under the fourth amendment was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt); compare Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 
543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968) ("Because the [improperly 
seized] rifle was plainly damaging evidence . . . its admission 
at the trial was not harmless error"). See also Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. , , 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-64 (1991); 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3105-06 
(1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-84, 106 S. Ct. 
1431, 1434-1438 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-
24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28 (1967) (all discussing harmless 
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constitutional error). So ruling, the Court has observed that 
reversal of convictions for constitutional error, even when such 
error is inconsequential to the trial verdict, "encourages 
litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to 
ridicule it." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 577, 106 S. Ct. at 
3105; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S. Ct. at 1436 (both 
quoting and approving R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 
(1970)). Accord Fulminante. Ill S. Ct. at 1264 (harmless error 
doctrine "promotes public respect for the criminal process by 
focusing on the underlying fairness of trial rather than on the 
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error" (quoting Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S. Ct at 1436)). 
Further, a trial court's failure to suppress wrongfully 
seized evidence is not constitutional error in and of itself. 
Rather, suppression under the "exclusionary rule" is simply a 
judicially created remedy for improper searches and seizures. 
United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 
(1974). See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 473 (Utah 1990) 
(two-justice plurality opinion invoking exclusionary rule under 
article I, section 14, without deciding whether the rule is 
constitutionally required: "We simply hold that it exists"); 
contra State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 484-85, 220 P. 704, 708 (1923) 
(unanimously rejecting exclusionary rule under article I, section 
14). Nor does the possibly erroneous denial of a suppression 
motion amount to a "structural defect" in the ensuing trial. 
Instead, as with evidentiary admissibility rulings in general, 
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such error is the kind of error that can be "quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented" for its 
actual impact upon the trial. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at , 
111 S. Ct. at 1263 (explaining that structural errors are those 
that call the fairness of trial itself into question). 
Indeed, in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 
639 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the federal 
approach, endorsed a harmlessness analysis even for errors that 
are constitutional in magnitude: 
We think the correct view, and the one which is 
both practical and in keeping with the desired 
objective of fundamental fairness and due process 
of law, is that there is a presumption that 
[constitutional] error is prejudicial, but that it 
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that it had no such prejudicial 
effect upon the proceedings. Correlative to this 
it is also true that when the guilt is shown by 
other untainted evidence so overwhelming that 
there is no likelihood whatsoever of a different 
result in the absence of such error or 
irregularity, there should be no reversal. 
24 Utah 2d at 208, 648 P.2d at 643 (footnotes omitted). So 
holding, the Utah court approved the policy of avoiding 
"unnecessary proliferation of legal proceedings." Id. 
Harmless error analysis has also been at least tacitly 
approved under the Utah Constitution. The Scandrett opinion did 
not distinguish between federal and state constitutional error. 
However, there is no reason to believe that Scandrett was 
intended to make the analysis available only in cases of federal 
error, given that the same policy considerations apply under both 
constitutions. Indeed, post-Scandrett Utah Supreme Court 
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opinions do not question the availability of harmless error 
analysis under the state constitution. Rather, they merely 
express reservation about the form of such analysis. See State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989); State v. Hackford. 
737 P.2d 200, 205 n.3 (Utah 1987). 
In sum, this Court can confidently hold that harmless 
error analysis is permitted in reviewing allegedly erroneous 
denial of motions to suppress, under both the fourth amendment 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The only 
question is how to apply the analysis. 
2. Parameters of the Harmless Error Analysis. 
The State answers that question by voluntarily assuming 
a heavy burden. Chapman, endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the above-quoted passage from Scandrett. places the burden upon 
the State to demonstrate that a constitutional error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.7 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828. 
Even though an erroneous failure to apply the exclusionary rule 
is not itself a constitutional error, the State shoulders the 
burden of proving harmlessness in this case. 
7The error in Chapman lay in permitting the prosecutor to 
comment at length upon the defendants' decision to not testify at 
their trial. 386 U.S. at 19-20, 87 S. Ct. at 825-26. 
The State reserves its prerogative, in some future case, to 
argue that harmless error analysis, applied to the allegedly 
erroneous failure to apply the exclusionary remedy for search and 
seizure violations, might proceed differently--perhaps even with 
the burden of demonstrating trial-level harm placed upon the 
defendant. Chambers v. Maroney and Bumper v. North Carolina do not 
appear to allocate the burden of persuasion in this context. 
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To show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
State adapts the test set forth in Van Arsdall, a case that 
involved the erroneous denial of the defendant's confrontation 
rights at trial. Modified to fit the exclusionary rule error 
alleged in this case, the State first examines the challenged 
evidence for its importance to the prosecution. The overall 
strength of the State's case, independent from that evidence, is 
then be examined. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S. Ct. at 
1438. This "overwhelming evidence" analysis is identical to that 
set forth in Scandrett, quoted above, where the at-trial 
admissibility of an accused's statements to police was in issue. 
As just mentioned, the Utah Supreme Court has expressed 
reservation about how to apply harmless error analysis under the 
state constitution. In Hackford, 737 P.2d at 205 n.3, the court 
asserted that the Van Arsdall "overwhelming evidence" test of 
harmless error is more lenient than the earlier formulation in 
Chapman, which states: "The question is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction." 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S. Ct. at 827 
(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 
230 (1963)). But strictly read, that formulation would make 
harmless constitutional error analysis--specifically endorsed in 
Chapman and Scandrett--impossible to satisfy. The "overwhelming 
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evidence" test relaxes the standard just enough to make harmless 
error analysis viable in constitutional error situations.8 
The modern "overwhelming evidence" test of harmless 
error is especially appropriate in this case, given that the 
exclusionary rule violation asserted by Genovesi is not itself of 
constitutional magnitude. In shouldering the burden of 
persuasion under the overwhelming evidence test, the State will 
further obey the caveat very recently set forth by the federal 
Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 
2078 (1993): 
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the 
basis on which "the jury actually rested its 
verdict." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. , [, 
111 S. Ct. 1884, ] (1991) (emphasis added). 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in 
this trial was actually attributable to the error. 
113 S. Ct. at 2081. 
Under these parameters, the State's Van Arsdall and 
Scandrett-based harmless error analysis is stringent yet 
8In the context of a confrontation clause violation, as 
happened in Van Arsdall, the Utah Supreme Court noted criticism of 
the "overwhelming evidence" analysis. Defense-favoring evidence 
that might have been gleaned through confrontation and cross 
examination may be not known on appeal. An appellate court, 
reviewing the error for harmlessness, therefore may indulge in 
excessive speculation about the content of the denied evidence, and 
may also deny the defendant's jury trial right, by ruling upon 
evidence that has not been placed before a jury. See Hackford, 737 
P.2d at 205 n.3, and The Supreme Court, 1985 Term--Leading Cases, 
100 Harvard L. Rev. 100, 115-16 (1986), cited therein. Such 
problem is not present in this case, for Genovesi only complains of 
evidence that was admitted, and is therefore known on appeal: he 
has no complaint that he was denied his fair right to "confront" 
the State's evidence, or to elicit his own evidence. 
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realistic: it should satisfy both federal and state 
constitution-based requirements. Under it, Genovesi's guilty 
verdict, like that of the accused in Chambers v. Maroney, is 
attributable to overwhelming evidence that, without dispute, was 
properly admitted--and not to evidence obtained during the 
challenged home searches. 
3. Application of Harmless Error Analysis. 
Because the wash cloth seized during the March 20 
search was not offered into evidence, it will not be addressed. 
The State's harmless error analysis addresses the following, 
actually admitted evidence: the interior photographs and 
measurements of the Genovesi home; the hair taken from the dented 
plasterboard wall; the dented wall piece removed from the home; 
the piece of carpet removed from the home. Compared to other, 
overwhelming State's evidence, the admission of these items was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Photographs and Measurements 
Several of the home photos show the bunk bed from 
which, under the defense theory, Gavin Adams may have fallen, 
causing his injuries (State's exhibits 24-27, admitted at R-
452). One or two photos show the dented wall (State's exhibits 
27 and 28, admitted at R. 452). Apparently based on measurements 
taken by police, the jury learned the height of the bunk bed, and 
the height of the dent in the home's wall (R. 741, 692-92A). 
None of this evidence was especially probative of any pertinent 
trial fact. Arguably, much of this evidence might have been 
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excluded as irrelevant, cumulative, or time-wasting, Utah R. 
Evid. 401, 402, 403, had Genovesi raised such objection. 
Hair 
As things developed at trial, the hair found in the 
wall dent only "could have" come from Gavin Adams's head; its 
origin was not certain. The prosecutor conceded as much in his 
closing argument to the jury (R. 905). Thus the broken-off 
strand of hair held negligible value, if any, for the purpose of 
proving Genovesi's guilt. 
Dented Piece of Wall 
This item also proved unhelpful to the State's case. 
It was "almost certain," the prosecutor admitted to the jury, 
that Gavin Adams's head injury had not been caused by being 
struck against the wall (R. 863, 904-06). Further, Genovesi 
himself, through his own expert witnesses, described elaborate 
tests on a similar piece of plasterboard (R. 395-96, 815-28). 
Those tests were evidently designed to show that Gavin's skull 
had not been fractured against the wall--a possibility that, 
again, the State conceded. Such concession, however, in no way 
ruled out numerous other hard surfaces against which Gavin could 
have been battered, causing his death: it was unnecessary, as an 
element of murder or manslaughter, to prove the exact method and 
place of Gavin's death. 
Piece of Carpet 
The carpet was heavily relied upon by Genovesi, rather 
than by the State. Again through his expert witnesses, Genovesi 
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attempted to show that Gavin Adams's fatal injuries could have 
been caused by a fall from the bunk bed, on to the carpeted 
floor, rather than by Genovesi's hands (R. 392-95, 780-803). As 
State's evidence, the piece of carpet was needless for proving 
Genovesi's guilt. 
Independent Strength of State's Case 
Independent, properly-received State's evidence was 
overwhelmingly probative of Genovesi's guilt. The medical 
examiner's testimony, by itself, soundly defeated the defense 
theory that Gavin Adams had died from an accidental fall. 
Gavin's injuries, the examiner testified, were far too severe to 
support that theory (R. 587-88, 624-35). This evidence was 
stressed to the jury (R. 861-63, 871, 900). Indeed, as a matter 
of common experience, the likelihood that a simple, in-home fall 
could cause Gavin's severe head and neck injuries appears 
vanishingly remote. 
Independent evidence also showed that the defense 
theory of an accidental fall was inconsistent with Genovesi's 
"911" call, which was taken by emergency responders to suggest a 
fresh accident: instead, Gavin appeared dead beyond 
resuscitation to the responding medical personnel (R. 498). The 
jury learned that in all likelihood, Gavin had suffered his fatal 
injuries several hours before Genovesi placed the emergency call 
(R. 623) . These inconsistencies supported a powerful inference 
that no accident caused those injuries, but that instead, Gavin 
was physically battered by Genovesi; then, in the vain hope that 
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Gavin's injuries were not serious, Genovesi waited several hours 
before summoning help, and fabricated the "fall" report. 
Further inconsistencies in the defense theory were also 
powerfully telling. These included Genovesi's varying accounts, 
to emergency responders and police, about where and how the 
"fall" suffered by Gavin had occurred, and about the location of 
Gavin's brother when that "accident" happened (R. 497, 511-12, 
520, 530, 537, 565-67, 855, 892). 
Quite independently of the evidence that Genovesi moved 
to suppress, then, the trial jury had ample and far more powerful 
evidence that Genovesi killed Gavin Adams. This Court should 
therefore hold that even if the trial court erroneously denied 
Genovesi's motion to suppress, such error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Upon such holding, Genovesi's request for 
reversal of his conviction, under the constitutional search and 
seizure errors he alleges, should be denied. 
C. The Trial Court's Denial of Genovesi's Motion 
to Suppress Can be Adequately Reviewed On the 
Present Record. 
If this Court does not find harmless error in the 
admission of evidence obtained during both home searches, it must 
address the arguments advanced by Genovesi. The State now 
responds to those arguments. 
Genovesi first argues that the trial court entered 
inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, underpinning 
its denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his 
home. The assailed "Findings and Order" (R. 112-13) are copied 
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in Addendum I to Genovesi's Brief of Appellant. Genovesi argues 
that this short written ruling does not permit meaningful 
appellate review, and that this case "must be remanded" for 
adequate findings and conclusions (Br. of Appellant at 14). 
The trial court's written ruling is inadequate in that 
it omits any mention of the March 20 search. (However, that 
inadequacy is due, at least in part, to Genovesi's failure to 
specify a challenge to that search in his written suppression 
motion.) The trial court's ruling is minimally adequate in its 
treatment of the March 21 search. Nevertheless, the fair 
interpretation of the ruling is that the trial court found the 
second search to have been conducted under the authority of Mrs. 
Genovesi's valid--i.e., voluntary--consent. 
The shortcomings in the trial court's ruling do not 
require a remand. The ruling was issued nearly two weeks before 
trial began (R. 113, 292), giving Genovesi ample time to object 
to its shortcomings in the trial court. No such objection 
appears in the record, and the failure to raise it constitutes 
its waiver now, on appeal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) ("Failure 
of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial . . . shall 
constitute waiver thereof . . . " ) . 
Even overlooking the waiver, this Court need not remand 
the suppression question for a more detailed trial court ruling. 
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court explained that the failure to enter detailed findings of 
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fact and conclusions of law does not always require reversal or 
remand. Instead, appellate courts will uphold a trial court's 
ruling whenever the record supports a presumption that the proper 
underlying factual findings were made. 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. 
Such a presumption is supported when the prevailing party's 
evidence is internally consistent, not self-contradictory or in 
conflict. See id. at 787 (police officers' testimony was in 
conflict, necessitating remand).9 
In this case, the trial court's denial of Genovesi's 
motion to suppress was supported by consistent State's evidence. 
The sole witness at the motion hearing was Officer Patrick. 
While acknowledging that the March 20 search was conducted 
without explicit consent, Patrick also described the search as 
cursory, limited to taking some photographs and the seizure of a 
wash cloth. No evidence contradicts this description. 
The manner in which Officer Patrick obtained Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was also 
uncontradicted: Patrick told Mrs. Genovesi of his wish to "take 
measurements and search for evidence" (R. 242) . Mrs. Genovesi 
was not told that she was required to comply with Patrick's 
request, nor was she threatened. Mrs. Genovesi facilitated 
Patrick's entry into the home, by sending a friend to meet him 
there with a key (R. 244-45). 
9Ramirez trumps this Court's prior suggestions on this 
question, e.g., State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.ll (Utah 
App. 1990), and State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (cited in Br. of Appellant 
at 14) . 
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There is only a single factual matter of note that was 
not addressed by the trial court. That is the question of 
whether Mrs. Genovesi's search consent, even though freely and 
voluntarily given, necessarily included permission for Officer 
Patrick to cut away and remove the dented wall section and a 
piece of carpet from the home. Neither Genovesi nor the State 
presented evidence, at the hearing of the motion to suppress, on 
this "scope-of-consent" issue. For the purpose of this appeal, 
however, the State concedes that Mrs. Genovesi's consent, as 
recounted in the present record, did not contemplate that pieces 
of the home itself would be collected by Officer Patrick. 
This Court is therefore presented with a trial court 
ruling that implicitly upheld the March 20 search of the Genovesi 
home, presumably by finding that search, on Officer Patrick's 
uncontroverted testimony, to be cursory in nature. The ruling 
explicitly upheld the March 21 search, presumably on a finding, 
also on uncontroverted evidence, that Mrs. Genovesi voluntarily 
consented to at least so much of the search as did not include 
the removal of the wall and carpet pieces. So clarified, the 
trial court's ruling can be reviewed on the present record. 
D. Genovesi's Challenges to the Two Home 
Searches Were, for the Most Part, Correctly 
Denied. 
1. The March 20 Search. 
The home search on March 20 was proper. Police entered 
the Genovesi home that day in response to Genovesi's call for 
emergency assistance. "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar 
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police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when 
they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of 
immediate aid." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 
2408, 2413 (1978). Genovesi's "911" call, inasmuch as it 
requested immediate aid for Gavin Adams, clearly operated to 
permit a police entry into his home. 
Further, once the dire nature of Gavin's injuries was 
known, there was probable cause to arrest Genovesi. The first-
arriving responders quickly ascertained that Gavin's neck 
appeared broken (R. 501). In light of such a severe injury, 
reasonable officers could readily determine that Genovesi's claim 
of an accidental fall rang false, and suspect him as the likely 
true cause of Gavin's injuries. At that moment, Genovesi was 
legally subject to arrest; indeed, he was arrested (R. 249). A 
limited search of the immediate premises, incident to his arrest, 
was then permissible. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-
85 (Utah App.) (citing authorities), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). Such a search was permissible even though it may 
have preceded, rather than followed, Genovesi's actual, formal 
arrest. Rawlinas v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 
2564 (1980) . 
With the foregoing bases for a warrantless search 
established, the remaining question is whether the March 20 
search was properly limited in scope. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 
393, 98 S. Ct. at 2413. There aire several components to this 
"scope" inquiry. 
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First, the search occurred during a continuous police 
presence in the Genovesi home--a presence that began before 
emergency medical workers removed the injured Gavin Adams. 
Genovesi inaccurately asserts that no officers arrived until 
after emergency medical workers removed Gavin (Br. of Appellant 
at 10). While testimony at the hearing of Genovesi's motion to 
suppress does suggest this (R. 248-49), trial testimony shows 
that at least two police officers, Kendra Herlin and Steve 
Winters, entered the home before Gavin was removed (R. 516-18, 
561-63). Officer Patrick, who conducted the search, arrived 
after Gavin was removed, but while Officer Herlin was still 
present (R. 240-41). This undercuts Genovesi's apparent 
allegation that officers entered his home only after Gavin was 
removed, and used false "emergency" authority to conduct the 
March 20 search. 
Next, Genovesi at least implicitly contends that once 
the scene was secured, and all occupants of his home accounted 
for, Officer Patrick could not make any further intrusion without 
explicit consent, or a search warrant (Br. of Appellant at 10; R. 
248). While not spelling it out, Mincey clearly supports such a 
rule. 437 U.S. at 393-95, 98 S. Ct. at 2413-15. Similarly, it 
cannot be surely said that the two bedrooms entered by Officer 
Patrick as the purported site of Gavin's "accident" were 
necessarily within Genovesi's immediate control, for the purpose 
of the "search incident to arrest" rule. In Harrison, however, 
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this Court took note of the rather elastic definition of the area 
within an arrestee's "immediate control." 805 P.2d at 784. 
Under both the "emergency" and "incident to arrest" 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the textual constitutional 
limitation, under both the fourth amendment and article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, is reasonableness. A 
reasonableness-based approach to the March 20 search is proper, 
even acknowledging, as did Officer Patrick, that the immediate 
emergency had diminished when he arrived at the Genovesi home (R. 
248). It is also proper even if the search does not perfectly 
fit the judicially-defined limits of an emergency scene search or 
a search incident to arrest. In a post-Mincey opinion, the 
Supreme Court held that "[t]he reasonableness of any particular 
governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on 
the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." Illinois 
v. Lafavette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610 (1983). 
Thus even if Officer Patrick might be criticised for failing to 
more strictly circumscribe the March 20 search, such criticism 
ought not render that search unreasonable per se.10 
Under these principles, Officer Patrick's March 20 
search of the Genovesi home, incident to the emergency call, was 
reasonably limited in scope, even if not perfectly so. No 
10A prompt inspection of the premises, as occurred here, was 
not appropriate solely to assure safety and perhaps discover 
incriminating evidence. It was also important, and potentially 
beneficial, as a means to possibly corroborate G€*novesi's claim 
that Gavin Adams had been injured in an accidental fall. A 
flexible standard of reasonableness, as permitted in Lafayette, is 
therefore appropriate. 
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evidence contradicts Patrick's characterization of that search as 
"very preliminary, cursory" (R. 248) . In an attempt to confirm 
or dispel Genovesi's report that Gavin Adams had been injured in 
a fall, Patrick merely entered the two rooms variously described 
by Genovesi as the site of Gavin's "fall," and took some 
photographs (R. 249). The only item physically seized was the 
wash cloth—again, not pertinent to this appeal. 
Officer Patrick's cursory investigation pales in 
comparison to the "exhaustive and intrusive" four-day, 
warrantless apartment search that was condemned in Mincey, 437 
U.S. at 389, 98 S. Ct. at 2411.X1 Patrick's initial search of 
the Genovesi home was reasonably commensurate in scope to the 
emergency situation that prompted it, and also to the scope of a 
search incident to Genovesi's arrest. Although not perfect, the 
March 20 search should be deemed permissible. 
2. March 21 Search. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Genovesi 
voluntarily consented to the second home search, on March 21.12 
Genovesi agrees that his wife had authority to consent to the 
1111
 [T] he entire apartment was searched, photographed, and 
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, 
and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they 
dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; they pulled up 
sections of the carpet and removed them for examination. Every 
item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and 200 
to 300 objects were seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was 
subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive search." 437 U.S. at 389, 
98 S. Ct. at 2411. 
"There were no exigent circumstances to justify the March 21 
search. Cf. Br. of Appellant at 37. For that second search, the 
State relies solely upon consent. 
33 
search (Br, of Appellant at 17, citing State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 
1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991), and federal authority). He argues, 
however, that his wife did not give her consent voluntarily, and 
that Patrick exceeded the scope of the consent that was given. 
The State addresses, in turn, Genovesi's arguments under the 
fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. It then turns to the "scope of consent" question 
regarding the March 21 search. 
Fourth Amendment 
Under federal law, "the question of whether a consent 
to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress 
or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of all the circumstances." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
2047-48 (1973) (emphasis added); accord State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 82 (Utah App. 1990) ("We deferentially review a trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent, . . . disturbing it only if the 
appellant demonstrates that there has been clear error"). 
However, in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this precedent, and applied a "two-
standard" appellate approach to the voluntary consent question. 
Under that approach, the appellate court defers only to the trial 
court's findings of underlying "subsidiary" facts, and reserves 
the "voluntariness" determination, derived from those facts, as a 
nondeferentially-reviewed legal matter. 846 P.2d at 1270-71. 
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Under either standard of appellate review, adequate 
evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Genovesi 
voluntarily consented to the March 21 search. In seeking the 
consent, Officer Patrick explained his intentions to Mrs. 
Genovesi at least twice (R. 242-44) . She, in turn, facilitated 
his entry, by dispatching a friend with the house key to meet 
Officer Patrick (R. 244-45). This evidence reveals no claim by 
Patrick that he already had authority to search the Genovesi 
home; nor does it suggest the use of force, deception, or trick 
to obtain the consent.13 Instead, it reveals that Patrick made 
a request, with which Mrs. Genovesi willingly cooperated. See 
State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (listing 
factors to be considered in voluntary consent determination). 
Patrick's wholly uncontradicted testimony is also sufficiently 
"clear and positive" to overcome the "presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights," set by this Court 
in Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
Although article I, section 14 is virtually identical 
in text to the fourth amendment, Genovesi urges a divergent 
analysis of the consent question under this state constitutional 
provision. He argues that a "Miranda-type warning," advising a 
person of his or her right to refuse, and the consequences of 
"Compare Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. 
Ct. 1788, 1791 (1968) (valid consensual search not possible where 
"consent" was given in response to police officer's unsubstantiated 
claim that he had a warrant). 
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granting consent, should be given whenever a search consent is 
sought (Br. of Appellant at 21-22 & n.14). In Schneckloth. 412 
U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048, the United States Supreme Court 
squarely rejected this argument under the fourth amendment. 
Defendant invites this Court to depart from this long-settled 
federal approach, and make the "Miranda-type warning" a "sine qua 
non" for finding, upon judicial review, that a search consent was 
valid under article I, section 14 (Br. of Appellant at 21). 
This Court should decline defendant's invitation. As 
the Utah Supreme Court has explained, state constitution-based 
departures from federal law "may be an appropriate method for 
insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 
1988). However, there has been no inconsistency in federal court 
adherence, as commanded in Schneckloth, to the "totality of the 
circumstances" approach to examining the voluntariness of a 
search consent. That analytical approach has also been embraced 
by both Utah appellate courts. See Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106 
("the prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of 
his right to refuse consent . . . " ) ; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 
133, 137 (Utah App. 1991). 
Further, other states to consider this question under 
their state constitutions have overwhelmingly opted to maintain 
the "totality of the circumstances" approach, wherein the 
"Miranda-type warning" is significant, but not dispositive, for 
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showing voluntary consent. E.g., People v. Havhurst, 571 P.2d 
721, 724 n.4 (Colo. 1977); State v. Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515, 
517 (Idaho 1980); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont. 
1982); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); Frink v. 
State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 
386, 389 (Ark. 1977); State v. Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 
1979); State v. Rodgers. 349 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Wis. 1984). 
Against this widespread adherence to the "totality" approach, 
Genovesi advances only State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 
1975), and Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983). 
Recently, in State v. Singleton, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(Utah App. 1993), this Court rejected a similar overture to 
depart from fourth amendment search and seizure analysis, in the 
context of a challenge to a search warrant. So doing, this Court 
rejected a strict "informant reliability" approach to the 
issuance of search warrants--previously discarded under the 
fourth amendment, and embraced a "totality of the circumstances" 
standard under the Utah Constitution. 214 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. 
The Court found "no reason" to depart from the settled, 
federally-originated "totality" approach.14 Id. 
14The Singleton panel also rejected the appellant's historical 
reference to the "unique circumstances" of Utah history. 214 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 33. Genovesi raises a similar historical argument in 
this case, observing that Utah's white settlers, because they 
practiced "slavery and polygamy," often found themselves in 
conflict with federal authorities (Br. of Appellant at 28). It is 
difficult, at best, to justify expansive search and seizure 
protections on the rationale that the settlers ran into trouble for 
practices that are now both widely disapproved and constitutionally 
forbidden. U.S. Const. Amend. XIII (slavery prohibited); Utah 
Const. Art. Ill, para. 1 ("polygamous or plural marriages are 
37 
The identically-named, federal approach to consent 
voluntariness appropriately recognizes that there is no 
"infallible touchstone" for determining voluntariness. 
Instead, the "totality" inquiry appropriately examines both the 
police conduct and the subjective state of mind of the person who 
is alleged to have consented. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 
S. Ct. at 2048-49. Further, rejecting a strict "Miranda-type 
warning" or "waiver" approach to search consents in Schneckloth, 
the Supreme Court observed that in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the "inherently coercive" nature of 
custodial interrogation--that is, police questioning of an 
arrestee--was the driving concern behind establishment of the 
"Miranda warning" requirement. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 240, 93 
S. Ct. at 2054. 
In this case, because Mrs. Genovesi was not in police 
custody when she consented to the March 21 search, the main 
concern underlying Miranda was absent. Nor were concerns about 
Mrs. Genovesi's fifth and sixth amendment protections against 
self-incrimination and the right to counsel particularly 
important. Those concerns, which also animated Miranda, were of 
greatly diminished importance in this case, given that Mrs. 
Genovesi was not an "accused" person, U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, 
Utah Const. Art. I § 12, at the time consent was sought. 
Genovesi therefore seeks to extend, to law governing 
consensual searches, policy considerations that have never been a 
forever prohibited"). 
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part of that law. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241, 93 S. Ct. at 
2055 ("There is a vast difference between those rights that 
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the 
Fourth Amendment"). See also American Fork City v. Croscrrove. 
701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 
358 (Utah 1980), and State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324, 1325 (Utah 
1976) (all holding that Utah's constitutional self-incrimination 
provision, Art. I § 12, does not bar physical evidence, but only 
coerced testimony or statements). That extension, rejected 
overwhelmingly under other state constitutions, and in conflict 
with settled, albeit federally-based, search and seizure law in 
Utah, should not be undertaken. Instead, this Court should hold 
that Mrs. Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was 
voluntary, under both the federal and Utah constitutions. 
Scope of Consent 
The final search and seizure question is whether the 
March 21 search was conducted within the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's 
consent. See State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah 1991), 
Grovier, 808 P.2d at 137, and State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
888 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
(searches that exceed scope of consent are unconstitutional). On 
this question, the trial court erred in part, but harmlessly. 
Reasonably viewed, Mrs. Genovesi's consent included 
permission to take photographs, and to make measurements in the 
home. These activities, not interfering with property rights, 
and of which Mrs. Genovesi was clearly informed, were not even 
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constitutionally-defined "seizures." See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 321, 324, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (1987) (conduct that does 
not "meaningfully interfere" with possessory interests is not a 
seizure). The piece of hair was reasonably seized from the 
dented wall, inasmuch as nobody would reasonably assert an 
ongoing possessory interest in such an item. It was also well 
within the reasonable scope of Officer Patrick's request, to Mrs. 
Genovesi, that he wished to "go into the house and take 
measurements and search for evidence" (R. 242-44). 
Under the established facts, however, the State cannot 
justify Officer Patrick's removal of the wall and carpet sections 
from the home. He might have received permission to do this, had 
he made such a request to Mrs. Genovesi. But he made no such 
request, and nothing else in the record indicates that such 
dismantling of the home itself, even if minimal, was either 
contemplated by Mrs. Genovesi, or might reasonably be considered 
a normal part of a home search. 
Cutting away pieces of wall and carpet is qualitatively 
different from, say, temporarily removing an automobile heater 
hose, as was done in Grovier, 808 P.2d at 134-35, or unscrewing a 
home electrical fixture, to peer inside. Obviously, pieces of 
wall and carpet cannot be quickly replaced with the same tools 
used to remove them, as can the latter items. On the facts of 
record, the wall and carpet sections were unreasonably seized, 
and were erroneously admitted into evidence. 
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To affirm Genovesi's conviction despite the foregoing 
error, the State is therefore compelled to upon a harmless error 
analysis. As set forth earlier in this brief, all the evidence 
obtained in the Genovesi home was harmlessly admitted, for 
Genovesi was convicted upon far more powerful evidence, unrelated 
to any police misconduct. Even if this Court does not accept 
that argument in its entirety, it should accept its application 
to the wall and carpet sections. 
Again, the prosecutor acknowledged, to the jury, strong 
doubts about the probative value of the wall section. Again, 
Genovesi, not the State, heavily utilized the carpet section as 
trial evidence. Accordingly, beyond a reasonable doubt, these 
two items did not contribute to Genovesi's conviction: his fate 
was sealed by other, far more powerful evidence. The admission 
of the wall and carpet sections was therefore harmless error, and 
does not justify setting Genovesi's conviction aside.15 
15The State again notes that Genovesi, or a similarly situated 
home occupant, would not be bereft of any remedy for such an 
improper overreaching of a consensual home search. It appears 
entirely appropriate, under such circumstances and upon a proper 
request, to require the offending police agency to pay for the 
repairs needed to restore the home to its pre-search condition. 
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POINT TWO 
THERE WAS NO SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE GROUPS FROM THE 
PANEL OF PROSPECTIVE TRIAL JURORS. 
Genovesi next argues that his trial jury was selected 
from a panel of prospective jurors that was summoned in a manner 
contrary to his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.16 
To be impartial, a jury must be selected from a panel that 
represents a "fair cross-section" of the community from which it 
is summoned. Tavlor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S. Ct. 
692, 697-98 (1975); State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 574 (Utah 
1987). A fair cross-section panel is one from which no 
constitutionally "cognizable" groups have been systematically 
excluded. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 574-75. 
Cognizable groups are those that are "distinctive" in 
terms of holding a unique perspective on events, or who bring 
particular "qualities of human nature and varieties of human 
experience" to jury service. Peters v. Kiff. 407 U.S. 493, 503, 
92 S. Ct. 2163, 2169 (1972). See James H. Druff, Comment, The 
Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 
1555, 1561-62 (1985). Cognizable, or distinctive groups have 
been defined according to race, gender, national origin, 
religion, and economic status. See id. (citing cases). 
In fact, the forty-eight prospective jurors summoned 
for duty at Genovesi's trial appear to reflect an appropriate 
16Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, sets the procedure 
for jury selection. Genovesi does not allege a Rule 18 violation, 
but only a constitutional one. 
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cross-section of various cognizable groups. Roughly equally 
divided by gender, the panel included names such as Trimble, 
Samowitz, Sundquist-Valdez, Vavricek, Sorensen, Torres, Paulk, 
and Thurber (R. 23-25, copied at Appendix II of this brief). So 
far as can be discerned, these names appear to reflect a variety 
of at least national origins, and perhaps races and religions. 
Due to a computer "glitch," however, the jury panel 
contained mainly persons whose last names began with the letters 
"S" and "T." Genovesi contends that persons whose last names 
begin with the letters "A" through "R," largely excluded from the 
panel, constitute a "distinctive" or constitutionally 
"cognizable" group; the elimination of such persons from the 
panel, he argues, violated his impartial jury right. Three 
federal courts of appeals have considered the argument that such 
alphabetically-classified people are constitutionally cognizable: 
all have rejected it. See Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (following authority from the First and Eleventh 
Circuits). Genovesi cites no contrary judicial authority. 
Instead, Genovesi attempts to show "distinctiveness" in 
the alphabetically excluded jurors by reference to a Dr. Trevor 
Weston, who reported, in the mid-1960s, that persons whose last 
names begin with the letters "S" through "Z" are fifty percent 
more likely to develop "alphabetic neurosis" than are "A" through 
"R" surnamed persons (Br. of Appellant at 41-42). Nowhere does 
Genovesi explain the symptoms of this alleged malady. Further, 
"alphabetic neurosis" appears nowhere in the American Psychiatric 
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Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (3rd Ed., Rev. 1987) (DSM III-R), a publication that 
would presumably identify the malady if its overall incidence was 
at all noteworthy.17 
Because the DSM III-R does not recognize "alphabetic 
neurosis," one may reasonably assume that it is exceedingly rare, 
if it exists at all. A "fifty percent greater likelihood" of 
contracting such a malady, when its overall incidence appears 
negligible, is hardly significant. Therefore, Genovesi has no 
basis to assert that the panel summoned for jury duty in his case 
consisted "predominantly of people with alphabetic neurosis" (Br. 
of Appellant at 42). 
Further, the scientific article cited by Genovesi in 
support of his "alphabetic neurosis" argument actually discredits 
Dr. Weston's claim. In J. Autry & D. Barker, Academic Correlates 
of Alphabetical Order of Surname, 8 J. Sch. Psychology 22 (1970) 
(copied in Appendix III of this brief), three hundred students 
were tested for possible correlation of academic achievement with 
alphabetical order of surname. The resulting data, scrutinized 
for statistical significance, "did not support the hypothesis 
that academic achievement is related to alphabetic order of 
surname." Id. at 23. 
17The Utah Legislature has adopted the current DSM as its 
authority for defining mental illness. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-
12-202 (Supp. 1993); see also State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280 (Utah 
1988) (citing DSM-III as authority). 
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Just as it would seem at first glance, then, Genovesi's 
argument that the jury selection process improperly excluded 
persons without "alphabetic neurosis" is fanciful. No 
constitutionally cognizable group can be defined by the first 
letters of individuals' last names. 
Genovesi's jury selection complaint fails solely 
because of his failure to identify any constitutionally 
cognizable "distinctiveness" in persons whose last names begin 
with letters other than "S" and "T." If this Court wishes, it 
may also note that there was nothing "systematic" about the 
computer "glitch" that caused the omission of such persons from 
the panel of prospective jurors summoned for Genovesi's trial. 
Instead, as detailed by the jury selection clerk's 
testimony, the alphabetical summoning process used by the 
computer in this case was an unforeseen, random event (R. 297-
302, copied in Addendum IV to Br. of Appellant as T. 5-10). 
Nothing in the inherent design of the process was, directly or 
indirectly, aimed at "alphabetical exclusion." Compare Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366-67, 99 S. Ct. 664, 669-70 (1979) 
(selection system, by purposeful design, tended to exclude women 
at two critical points in panel-summoning process). Because no 
constitutionally cognizable group was excluded by any means that 
might be described as "systematic," then, Genovesi's sixth 
amendment-based jury selection challenge fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
There was no reversible error in the admission, at 
trial, of evidence obtained during the searches of Genovesi's 
home, Genovesi was found guilty of manslaughter, by a jury 
selected in accord with constitutional impartiality requirements. 
For these reasons, Genovesi's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^£> day of July, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY v (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Genovesi's Motion to Suppress, and Supporting Memorandum 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. ^IfCC^if 
Judge David Young 
The defendant, Jason Genovesi, by and through his attorney of record, G. Fred 
Metos, hereby moves this court to enter an order suppressing all evidence obtained 
as a result of the warrantless search of the defendant's residence. Said motion is 
made on the grounds and for the reason that there were neither exigent circumstances 
nor consent to justify said warrantless search. Consequently, that search violated 
both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
DATED this J^Kday of May, 1992. 
G. FRED<-MET6S 
Attorney for Defendant 
ononsn 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this A9 day of May, 1992, to: 
JAMES COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East Fourth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ht/A^w^~y 
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G. FRED METOS - 2250 
Attorney for Defendant 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
: Case No. ^ 2 - I ^ D O f e l 
JASON GENOVESI, 
: Judge David Young 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 20, 1992, paramedics were dispatched to a residence at 5459 West 
Balsa Avenue in Salt Lake County. The paramedics attended to an injured child, Gavin 
Adams. Sheriff's deputies arrived and secured the residence. In the residence, the 
deputies located a three year old, Justin Adams, and the eighteen year old stepfather 
of the two children, Jason Genovesi. Later that afternoon, Gavin Adams was 
pronounced dead at the Pioneer Valley Memorial Hospital. On March 21, 1992, 
sheriff's deputies re-entered the residence without a search warrant and without 
consent to make a crime scene inspection of the residence. The officers seized hair 
samples, carpet samples and cut out a piece of a wall. Measurements were also 




THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY 
THE SEARCH. 
When a life may be in danger or evidence destroyed, officers may conduct a 
search without taking time to obtain a search warrant. Mincv v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 
385 (1978); State v.Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). In Mincv. narcotics officers 
were attempting to purchase drugs. When the officers attempted to effect an arrest, 
a shootout ensued in which an undercover officer was killed. The officers initially 
entered the premises to locate the gunman and persons who may be injured. 
Detectives then spent four days processing the scene without a warrant. The Court 
held that the police may respond to emergency of life threatening situations without 
a warrant. However, the Court specifically held that " . . . a warrantless search must 
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation'", 437 U.S. at 
393. Similarly, in Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the Court allowed fire 
fighters to make a warrantless entry into a building to suppress a fire and conduct an 
initial investigation after the smoke and steam had cleared. This was justified by what 
was described as a " . . . compelling need for official action [when there is] no time to 
secure a warrant," 436 U.S. at 509. 
In State v. Ashe, supra, the court allowed narcotics officers to enter a residence 
without a warrant, effect an arrest and perform a protective sweep of a residence to 
- 2 -
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prevent the destruction or removal of evidence. In that case, agents were making a 
drug purchase from a woman named Glasser. She was to sell four ounces of cocaine 
for $8,500. The agent gave Glasser $500 to obtain one ounce of cocaine to inspect. 
Glasser was observed by surveillance agents leaving the restaurant where the money 
was received. They then watched her meet with a co-defendant, Cricks. Cricks was 
followed to Ashe's residence then back to a parking lot where he met with Glasser. 
Glasser then provided the cocaine to the officers. Glasser and Cricks were arrested. 
Prior to that time, Glasser stated that the rest of the deal was to take place shortly 
and would be conducted "at the door" of a residence. The officers went to Ashe's 
residence where they observed him moving away from an upstairs window. They 
were not aware of Ashe's existence or location until the transaction was in process. 
The court found that the officers did not have "a realistic opportunity to secure a 
warrant". Consequently, the court held that the warrantless entry fell within the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
Conversely, in State v. Northruo, 256 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988), police 
officers entered and searched the defendant's residence without a warrant. Money 
had been given a co-defendant, he entered the residence and was arrested after 
leaving. He did not have the money at the time of the arrest. The State claimed that 
there were exigent circumstances because they believed that the money may be 
destroyed or removed. The court of appeals recognized that preservation of evidence 
is an exigent circumstance that makes a search imperative. The court also held that 
- 3 -
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the burden of proving such a exigency is on the State. The court found that there 
were no exigent circumstances in Northnip to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. 
The officers knew where and when the drug transaction was to take place. There had 
been two previous transactions at that location. Surveillance units were in place and 
the transaction occurred when the courts were open. The co-defendant was not 
expected back in the residence at the time of he was arrested. 
Similarly in State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987), the Court held that 
the arrest of the defendant outside of his hotel room did not justify a warrantless 
entry and search of the room. In that case, hotel guests reported screaming in the 
defendant's room. The victim of the assault which was charged, was located at the 
manager's apartment naked and bleeding. The defendant stated he had a crazy 
person in his room. The State claimed exigent circumstances justified the search. 
The Court found that none were present since the defendant was outside of the room 
at the time of arrest. 
The search that was conducted in this case took place one day after the alleged 
homicide. There were no exigencies that excused the officers' failure to obtain a 
warrant. All of the persons had been rennoved from the residence and it had been 
locked and secured. The evidence seized as a result of the search of the defendant's 




THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS NOT SEARCHED 
PURSUANT TO A VOLUNTARY CONSENT. 
The Supreme Court has given some general tests to determine the voluntariness 
of a consent to search. In Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court 
held that the mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority to search does not 
constitute a voluntary consent. In that case, officers claimed to have a valid warrant 
and the defendant's mother allowed them to search his room. That warrant was later 
found to be invalid. 
Subsequently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court 
rejected the contention that before a consent may be voluntary, the person giving the 
consent must know he has a right to refuse to allow officers to search. The Court 
went on to hold that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not the result 
of duress or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances. The Court described some of the factors to 
be considered when applying this totality of the circumstances test. Those include: 
the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in custody, the nature 
of the police questioning, the environment in which the search took place, the 
defendant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent and any other circumstances 
that weigh on the issue of voluntariness. 
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The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search has been addressed 
by the Supreme Court in other contexts. The primary issues raised in United States 
v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544 (1980), were whether airport authorities had illegally 
stopped the defendant and if she voluntarily consented to accompany agents to an 
office. The Court found that the authorities acted properly in stopping and asking the 
defendant for identification. The Court went on to find that the defendant had 
consented to go to the Drug Enforcement Administration office. The officers had not 
kept the defendant's airline ticket or identification. The Court found that the 
defendant could reasonably interpret officers' actions to indicate that she did not have 
to accompany them. 
Conversely, in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), it was held that a stop 
of an individual based on less than probable cause cannot justify a detention in a small 
room by two police officers. The officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket 
and identification. They also had his luggage brought to the room where he was 
being held. The Court found that such a situation would result in the defendant's 
belief that he was under arrest. Because the defendant had not been informed that 
he was free to board his plane and he actually believed he was being detained, it was 
held that the encounter had lost its consensual nature. The Court went on to hold as 
a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since there was no probable cause to 
arrest, the search was illegal. Thus, the evidence was ordered suppressed. The Court 
then made the following observations about the nature of searches based on consent: 
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. . . where the validity of a search rests on consent, the 
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent 
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, 
a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere 
submission to a claim of lawful authority. 
460 U.S. at 497. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue in United 
States v. Recalde. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985). In that case, the defendant had 
been stopped for speeding in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license, 
and the car was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran a NCIC check to 
determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. The check was negative. He then 
requested assistance from a backup officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that 
the defendant was transporting narcotics. The officer returned to the defendant's car 
and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the ticket. When it was 
signed, the officer asked the defendant to step out of the car and requested to inspect 
the trunk. During the inspection, the officer found that there had been tampering with 
the screws in the molding. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany 
him to a nearby town. The defendant agreed to do so. At no time had the officer 
returned the defendant's driver's license, vehicle registration or provided the traffic 
ticket. At the police station the defendant consented to the search of the car. In 
analyzing the issue of whether the trip was made with the defendant's consent, the 
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Tenth Circuit employed a three tier analysis that was later adopted by this court in 
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990).1 
In determining if there has been duress or coercion in obtaining a consent to 
search, the Supreme Court of Utah has described a number of factors that should be 
considered. In State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated, 
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from 
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was 
voluntary given; however, the prosecution is not required 
to prove that defendant knew of his right to refuse to 
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may 
show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the 
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. [Footnote omitted] 
621 P.2dat 106. 
In State v. Marshall, supra, the court noted that the test for voluntariness must 
be based on the totality of the circumstances of the case. To determine if a consent 
is voluntary, the Utah court then adopted the Tenth Circuit's three part test2: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific11 and "freely and 
intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
1That analysis will be discussed, infra. 
2See: United States v. Recalde. supra. 
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(3) the court indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived. 
791 P.2d at 888. 
With respect to the scope of a search made pursuant to a consent, the court 
in Marshall, also relied on Tenth Circuit cases. On that issue, the court stated, 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, 
the ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the 
specific area agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a 
consent search is limited by the breadth of the actual 
consent itself . . . Any police activity that transcends the 
actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the suspect. 
&. at 888. 
Although the permission to search the house in this case was obtained from the 
defendant's wife, the same standard of voluntariness applies. Bumper v. North 
Carolina, suora. It is expected that the evidence will show that any consent to the 
search was not clear positive or unequivocal. State v. Marshall, suora. Likewise, it 
is expected that the evidence will show that the consent was not free from duress or 
coercion. Consequently, the evidence seized should be ordered to be suppressed. 
DATED this j U . day of July, 1992. 
^L^Js&L 
G. FRED METOS ( 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this & day of^ UtfyT 1992, to: 
0 JAMES COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East Fourth South, Suite 300 




Jury Panel Members 
OF JUDGMENT RATHER THAN OF EMOTION-CHARGED REACTIONS OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES. I HOPE EVERYONE WILL BE ATTENTIVE TO THAT 
REQUEST. 
COUNSEL, ANYTHING FURTHER IN THAT REGARD? 
MR. COPE: NO, YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU. 
MR. METOS: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I WILL BE IN BRIEF 
RECESS WHILE WE CONVENE THE PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL. YOU 
MAY HAVE TO ORGANIZE THE SEATING TO DO THAT. 
(RECESS). 
JUDGE YOUNG: GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. 
THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR TRIAL IN THE CASE OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH VERSUS JASON THOMAS GENOVESI. THE CASE NUMBER IS 
92-1900681. 
ARE THE PARTIES PRESENT AND PREPARED TO PROCEED? 
MR. COPE: JAMES COPE AND KIMBERLY HORNAK 
APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. THE STATE OF UTAH IS READY 
TO PROCEED, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. METOS: FRED METOS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT 
HE'S PRESENT AND WE'RE READY TO PROCEED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE 
BEEN SUBPOENAED HERE AS PROSPECTIVE JURORS I'LL ASK THAT 




























YOU COME FORWARD IMMEDIATELY AND BE SEATED AT THE DIRECTION 












CLERK: NO. 27, TERRY, T-E-R-RY, TRUDI G.; 
42, TREXLER, T-R-E-X-L-E-R, RUTH DIANA; 
23, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, GRANT; 
9, SHRIVER, S-H-R-I-V-E-R, CYNTHIA LADD; 
28, THACKER, T-H-A-C-K-E-R, JONI S.; 
49, ULIBARRI, U-L-I-B-A-R-R-I, VICKIE M.; 
4, SAMOWITZ, S-A-M-O-W-I-T-Z, SCOTT DEE; 
35, THORNTON,. T-H-O-R-N-T-O-N, TAMARA B.; 
31, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, KENT MADSEN; 














44, TRIPP, T-R-I-P-P, KEITH; 
29, THATCHER, T-H-A-T-C-H-E-R, ALTON VERE; 
24, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, JOANN LILLIAN; 
* 1 
* 1 
21, TANNER, T-A-N-N-E-R, LILA JANE; 
7, SHARP, S-H-A-R-P, SHARON CELINE; 
12, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, GLENN C ; 
43, TRIMBLE, T-R-I-M-B-L-E, STEPHEN A.; 
41, TOWNER, T-O-W-N-E-R, LISA JEAN; 
50, VAVRICEK, V-A-V-R-I-C-E-K, BONNIE L.; 
25, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, KENNETH D.; 
34, THOMSON, T-H-O-M-S-O-N, DANIEL L.; 
1, DAVIES, D-A-V-I-E-S, MARK; 
23 
000313 
22, TARPENNING, T-A-R-P-E-N-N-I-N-G, GREG 
16, SORENSEN, S-O-R-E-N-S-E-N, SANDRA R.; 
32, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, RICHARD JOSEPH; 
*f0, TORRES, T-O-R-R-E-S, PAUL LOVATO; 
18, STEADMAN, S-T-E-A-D-M-A-N, KAREN H.; 
26, TAYLOR, T-A-Y-L-O-R, MICHAEL JON; 
30, THEURER, T-H-E-U-R-E-R, CAROL MUIR; 
2, JENSEN, J-E-N-S-E-N, SHELLY ANN; 
ltf, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, VIRGINIA RUTH; 
15, SORENSEN, S-O-R-E-N-S-E-N, MARCE AIKEN; 
11, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, ELIZABETH T.; 
47, TUTTLE, T-U-T-T-L-E, SAMUEL E.; 
*f6, TUCKER, T-U-C-K-E-R, TODD MARTIN; 
8, SHERMAN, S-H-E-R-M-A-N, LYNNE P.; 
10, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, DONNA KREMERS; 
13, SMITH, S-M-I-T-H, HOWARD LUCIEN; 
5, SARA, S-A-R-A, STEVEN C ; 
48, TWINTING, T-W-I-N-T-I-N-G, KARLA NIELSEN; 
3, PAULK, P-A-U-L-K, KAREN M.; 
19, STECK, S-T-E-C-K, DAVID KEITH; 
38, TINGEY, T-I-N-G-E-Y, GARY; 
37, THURBER, T-H-U-R-B-E-R, CAROLYN LOCKETT; 
39 , TORGERSEN, T - O - R - G - E - R - S - E - N , BONNIE; 












 I NO. 33, THOMAS, T-H-O-M-A-S, TAMARA; 
2
 ' NO. 17, SORENSON, S-O-R-E-N-S-O-N, EILEEN. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL OF YOU WHO HAVE BEEN SEATED 
4
 I NOW AS PROSPECTIVE JURORS, WILL YOU STAND TOGETHER AND 
5
 RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND AND RECEIVE AN OATH FROM THE CLERK? 
6
 I CWHEREUPON, THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE SWORN 
IN). 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. AND YOU MAY EACH BE 
SEATED. 
THE INITIAL PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR A JURY 
TRIAL IS TO INQUIRE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS OF FACTS THAT 
MAY BE HELPFUL FOR COUNSEL TO SELECT AN APPROPRIATE PANEL 
FOR THE JURY. I WANT TO SAY TO YOU, FIRST OF ALL, THAT 
14
 | I THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONDING TO THE REQUEST OF THE COURT 
15
 | TO COME FORWARD AND TO PROSPECTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THIS 
16
 ' JURY. I KNOW THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO SO COME IS NOT AT 
A MOST CONVENIENT* TIME FOR YOU. I KNOW THAT YOUR LIFE AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE OTHER THAN YOU MIGHT PREFER TO BE HERE. 
BUT I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING. 
THIS CASE IS A MURDER CASE. THE DEFENDANT IN 
THIS CASE IS ACCUSED OF HAVING KILLED A TWO AND A HALF YEAR 
OLD STEPSON ON MARCH 20TH, 1992 IN A RESIDENCE IN KEARNS. 
AS WE BEGIN PRELIMINARILY INQUIRING OF EACH OF 
YOU—WELL, LET ME SAY REGARDING THAT FACTUAL STATEMENT, 
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ACADEMIC CORRELATES OF ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF SURNAME 
JOSEPH W. AUTRY 
Tarkton State College 
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Texas A&M University 
Summary: This study was suggested by Weston's contention that alphabetic position of sur-
name might be a significant independent variable affecting human characteristics. Using 
the 306 twelfth grade students of a heterogeneous high school as a sample, correlation co-
efficients were computed to indicate the degree of relationship between alphabetical order of 
surname and each of eleven variables of the Iowa Test of Educational Development Corre-
lations were generally of a direction indicating higher achievement associated with students 
whose last names be^an with the letters toward the beginning of the alphabet, but most of 
these were not statistically significant 
In an Associated Press release 
(1967), Dr. Trevor Weston was re-
Girted to have described to the British edical Association a condition he 
called "alphabetic neurosis." According 
to the newspaper account, Weston 
found in a ten vear survey of mortality 
statistics a t ; xmdon teaching hospital 
that the ir ir ace of neurosis was D0% 
higher an: . persons whose last names 
began wit :AC letters "S" through "Z" 
than ami - those whose last names be-
gan with tfie letters "A" through "R." 
Weston (1965) further found that in-
dividuals in die S-Z group were twice 
as prone as others to ulcers and three 
times more likely to undergo heart at-
tacks. In personal correspondence, 
Weston (1967) classified his paper on 
"alphabetic neurosis" as a presentation 
of a hypothesis supported <by prelimi-
nary investigation rather than as a 
completed research project. He attrib-
uted the adverse effects of a name be-
S'nning near the end of the alphabet to 
e constant strain of waiting for one's 
name to be reached in the classroom 
and in other situations. 
Weston's work (1965) suggested to 
the authors that alphabetic order of 
surname might be associated with aca-
demic achievement as well as with 
physical and mental health. This study 
is a partial test of that hypothesis. 
Subjects. The subjects of this study 
were the 306 twelfth grade students of 
a comprehensive high school which 
draws students from all sectors of a 
small city in central Texas. They were 
approximately evenly divided between 
boys (158) and girls (148). 
PROCEDURE 
Within each sex, the subjects* last 
names were listed alphabetically and 
ranked ordinally, with the names near-
est the beginning of the alphabet rank-
ed lowest and those nearest the end 
ranked highest The ranks thus as-
signed were treated as measures of 
alphabetic order. No attempt was made 
to transform these to other than a rec-
tilinear distribution. 
The subtest scores of the Iowa Test 
of Educational Development (1963) 
were available for each subject and 
were used as the measures of academic 
achievement The following variables 
of the ITED were considered: social 
studies background, science back-
ground, correctness of expression, 
quantitative thinking, social studies 
reading, science reading, literary read-
ing, average of reading tests, general 
vocabulary, comprehensive achieve-
ment, ana use of sources. 
Alphabetic order was correlated with 
each of these ITED measures, using the 
product-moment coefficient of correla-
tion. According to DuBois (1965), the 
derivation of the formula for the 
product-moment correlation coefficient 
makes no assumption regarding the 
shapes of the distributions correlated, 
except when applying the standard er-
ror of estimate in specific instances of 
prediction. The correlation analysis was 
perfonned separately for the sample of 
158 boys and the sample of 148 girls 
Correlations with absolute values be-
yond 0.16 were considered indicative 
of relationships significantly different 
from independence or zero relation-
ships. 
RESULTS \ND DISCUSSION 
The coefficients of correlation of al-
phabetic order of surname with the 
various measures of academic achieve-
ment for both groups are displayed in 
Table 1. Positive correlations indicate 
Table 1 
Academic Correlates of Alphabetic 
Order of Surname 
ACADEMIC CORRELATES 
Variable Correlation with Alphabetic 
Order of Surname 
Bon Girl* 
< * - ? » ) W -148) 
Social studies background -0.01 
Science background .0.12 
Correctness of expression -0.02 
Quantitative thinking -0.02 
Reading: social studies 0.02 
Reading: science .0.05 
Reading: literary materials 0.00 
Reading: average -0.01 
General vocabulary .0,05 
Comprehensive achievement -0.04 
Use of sources .0.06 













that higher academic achievement is 
associated with names nearer the end 
of the alphabet, while negative corre-
lations indicate the reverse: higher aca-
demic achievement associated with 
names nearer the beginning of the al-
phabet 
The 22 correlation coefficients varied 
from -0.19 to +0.02. All but two of 
the 22 coefficients were negative (one 
23 
was 0.02, and one 0.00), but only one 
was significantly different from zero, 
beyond the 0.05 level of confidence. All 
the correlations of alphabetic order 
with achievement were negative in the 
analysis of the data for girls; and, in 
every case, the correlation was "more 
negative" in the data for girls than in 
those for boys. 
The correlation data did not gen-
erally permit rejecting the null hypoth-
eses of zero correlations and therefore 
did not support the hypothesis that 
academic achievement is related to al-
phabetic order of surname. Most of the 
correlations, however, were of such a 
direction as to suggest a tendency to-
ward higher achievement by students 
whose names begin nearer ithe begin-
ning of the alphabet, especially in the 
case of the data for girls. 
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